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Disbelief About Belief
Why Secular Academics Do Not Understand the Motivations of
Religious Fundamentalists
 




The Dutch newspaper Financieel Dagblad recently published a rather disturbing
interview with a former member of the Hofstad Network, a jihadist group that was
active in the Netherlands in the first few years of this century. This ex-Islamist, named
Jason Walters, threw a hand grenade at police during a raid in The Hague in 2004,
and was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment in 2006 for his part in terrorist
activities. However, Walters deradicalized himself in jail, mostly by studying the
natural sciences and reading philosophers such as Plato. First he disowned the
ideology of jihadism, then he renounced the Islamic faith itself. He is currently
conducting research into the social networks of jihadism as an academic at Leiden
University. One of the most remarkable parts of the interview is his opinion about the
work of his academic colleagues. According to Walters, the studies and theories that
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they have been publishing for many years about radicalization and salafism are
"complete bullshit”.
 
As an academic myself, I usually shy away from using that sort of language, but I
think Walters is not far off the mark. In fact, there is a profusion of (mostly
contradictory) theories on this subject in academic circles, with little empirical support
or theoretical validity. What these theories have in common is that they try very hard
to ignore the elephant in the room, namely religious ideology. Every conceivable
motive for, or potential root cause of, radicalization (itself a weasel word) has been
examined over the years, except the one that the terrorists themselves say is at the
root of their actions. Religion has hardly anything to do with it, according to these
academics, except perhaps as a superficial pretext that is invoked by terrorists to
disguise their “true  motives”.
 
These “bullshit” theories have a long pedigree. Consider the influential theory of
suicide bombing by political scientist Robert Pape. In his 2005 book, Dying to Win:
The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, Pape used a refrain that many other authors
were to repeat afterwards, namely that suicide bombing is not driven by religious
belief at all. According to Pape, terrorists blow themselves up because they are
deliberately pursuing a "specific secular and strategic goal", namely "to compel
modern democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists
consider to be their homeland." That statement was already implausible back in 2003,
when Pape wrote these words in the New York Times, but it has become even less
credible as Pape has been forced to extend and distort the concept of foreign military
occupation in such a way that his theory is always rescued from the facts. Take
Pakistan, which has been an independent country since the end of British rule in 1947,
and yet has seen dozens of suicide attacks in recent years despite having hardly any
foreign military presence and certainly nothing that could count as “occupation”. But
Pakistan, according to Pape, is subject to something called "indirect occupation", since
the country has received foreign aid and its government’s policies were thus partly
guided by the interests of the donor countries. In his later work with James Feldman,
Pape also suggested that Pakistan "occupies" the tribal areas within its own borders;
how presumptuous of a sovereign state to take control of its own territory! There are
other obvious objections to Pape’s theory, too. How can it account for the fact that
many attacks carried out by Sunni radicals on Shiite mosques (and vice versa), or by
both of those groups on churches and Hindu temples, or the brutal lynching of secular
bloggers and other people deemed “blasphemers”? Are those acts of violence also a
response to “occupation”? In fact, the majority of suicide attacks in Pakistan have
been committed, not by Pakistanis, but by foreign fighters. The fact that these people
are prepared to travel to a foreign country to blow themselves up and kill dozens of
people strongly suggests that their motivation has little to do with ethnopolitical
questions of “occupation”. Another explanation (i.e., religious fanaticism) is far more
parsimonious, yet Pape studiously ignores it.
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In Walters’ words, there are many "bullshit theories" about jihadism and terrorism.
It’s a result of discrimination and disenfranchisement. Or, the attackers are just a
bunch of mentally unstable people looking for a way to justify their pre-existent
sadistic tendencies. Or, jihadists are just ordinary criminals, who hide behind a veneer
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of religiosity to kill and destroy. If ideology is allowed to figure in these theories, it’s
seen as a flimsy pretext at most. According to the anthropologist Scott Atran, jihadists
commit suicide attacks because they are following a "thrilling cause” and crave "glory
and recognition", which is true of many young men, although most stick to playing
football. The political scientist Rik Coolsaet claims that the root cause of jihadi
terrorism is a feeling of "not belonging"; jihadists have actually "never read" the
Qur’an, and "religion or politics have little to do with it." (Note that Coolsaet’s
rejection of politics also conflicts with Pape's theory.)
 
Last year, the British anthropologist Harvey Whitehouse published a target article in
the leading journal Behavioral and Brain Sciences in which he argued, like many
others before him, that suicide attacks are not driven by religion or ideology. On
Whitehouse’s account, the main cause of suicide terrorism is the process of "identity
fusion", which occurs when a group of people go through a traumatic ordeal together
with others, often in a ritual context. A typical example of such extreme self-sacrifice
is that of a soldier jumping on top of a grenade to protect his comrades, after having
bonded strongly with them through arduous drill exercises and prior combat
experience. But what about collective suicide operations such as 9/11, where the
express purpose of the mission was for the entire group to perish? Another problem
for Whitehouse’s theory, somewhat opposite to the first one, is that many of the
terrorists who have committed lone jihadi attacks in recent years have radicalized
themselves at home in front of their computers, by watching or listening to hate
preachers and other online material. Although these "lone wolves" typically swear
allegiance to IS or Al Qaeda in a video message before launching their attacks, in
many cases they have had no direct contact with anybody from the terrorist network,
let alone undergone painful initiation rituals. So how could these people have
experienced the collective trauma that is needed for Whitehouse’s process of identity
fusion?
 
Now, I don’t want to claim that these theories are completely worthless. It is plausible
that identity fusion can lead to a greater willingness to sacrifice oneself, and it is
surely true that radicalization often feeds on feelings of discrimination and other
grievances. But again, those factors start to make sense only when you seem them
through the prism of the Manichean religious worldview, in which the world is
separated into the “true believers” and an assortment of “enemies” (the kufar, the
apostates, the traitors). What is the factor that connects young European-born
terrorists to fellow fighters in other countries who speak different languages and come
from a different cultural background? Why do many religious fundamentalist believe
all sorts of conspiracy theories in which Islam is targeted, and become firmly
convinced that the West is hell-bent on destroying their religion? And yet, many
researchers try very hard to ignore or downplay the ideological dimension of these
actions. The self-proclaimed caliph of IS has a PhD in Qur’anic studies, their
theoreticians such as al-Maqdisi, al-Zawahiri, and al-Muhajir have written countless
theological tracts on jihadism, and an atmosphere of religious fervor leaps out at you
in every video message and from every page of the IS magazine Dabiq, but still, our
Western scholars know better.
 
One particular anecdote has often been cited by these researchers: The case of two
British fighters who bought "The Koran for Dummies" from Amazon before traveling to
Syria. Aha, you see, this proves that they (and by extension, everyone who ever left
to join IS or contemplated committing a terrorist attack at home) knew nothing about
Islam! In any other discussion, such logic would be laughed out of the room, but some
25-6-2019 Disbelief About Belief - New English Review
https://www.newenglishreview.org/pgprint.cfm?sec_id=189671 4/6
academics and pundits seem to think it constitutes a "smoking gun" that nullifies all
other evidence of the terrorists’ religiosity. The obvious question, of course, is why
these men felt that it might be a good idea to brush up on their knowledge of the
Qur'an before traveling to Syria, rather than, say, “Arabic for Beginners,” or the user
manual for an AK-47?
 
Not only do the tortuous efforts of these academics ignore the elephant in the room ;
they also obstruct the search for a solution. In the recent edited volume
Radicalization: A Marginal Phenomenon or a Mirror to Society?, published by Leuven
University Press, the authors criticize policymakers who have started to pay more
attention to the ideological dimension of terrorism. Of course, this is understandable
from the policymakers’ point of view, since the whole point of deradicalization
programs is to dismantle the extremist ideology that has taken root in the minds of
jihadists. Policymakers have a more pratical mindset than academics: they want to
prevent terrorist attacks. But the authors of Radicalization condemn this approach as
“reductionist," "essentialist," "one-dimensional”, and a few other cardinal academic
sins. Indeed, they find the whole concept of radicalization "problematic" in itself. The
reason for this is obvious: it’s hard to talk about radicalization without asking, what
are these people being radicalized into? And that’s exactly the question that these
authors want to avoid, because it "stigmatizes" all Muslims. Simply uttering the word
“Islamic” in the same breath as “terrorism” is "offensive", according to Rik Coolsaet,
who wrote the preface to the book. Even when the religious fanaticism is staring them
right in the face, as in the chapter in which the authors conduct a content analysis of
Dabiq, they conclude that, all things considered, religion hardly plays a role here.
 
Why do some academics have so much trouble taking religious motivations seriously?
Many people, Jason Walters included, would point to political correctness about Islam.
Most academics, especially in the humanities, have a progressive, leftist orientation.
For them, Islam is the religion of an oppressed non-white minority, and criticism of the
latter is suspect. Blaming Islam for violence and hatred is something to be avoided at
all costs. Many academics in the humanities regard it as their duty to counterbalance
the shift to the right in politics and public opinion. If minorities are being stigmatized,
academics must push back. If certain politicians start talking about “Islamic
terrorism”, academics should act as a counterweight. Moreover, academic
specialization has led to the formation of ideological enclaves, in which researchers
have laid down their own rules and end up talking mostly to like-minded colleagues.
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However, I do not think that this explanation is sufficient, as many political leaders
themselves—such as Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton—have had a hard time taking
the religious motivations of terrorists seriously (indeed, this may even have
contributed to Donald Trump’s unlikely victory). I would therefore like to propose
another hypothesis. Most academics have grown up in a thoroughly secularized
environment, in which religion played either no role at all, or only a very insignificant
one. If they were acquainted with God at all, it was a touchy-feely version that had
gone through the "washing machine of the Enlightenment"—as the Dutch politician
Pim Fortuyn called it—in which God was nothing more than an impersonal abstraction,
or a metaphor for the goodness of human beings. Religious faith was primarily an
intimate and personal affair, completely divorced from politics. Because of their
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indifference to religious faith, these godless Westerners have great difficulty imagining
what it means to believe in a concrete personal God, the kind of deity who revealed
himself in an infallible Holy Book, and who demands concrete actions and commitment
from its believers, on pain of eternal hellfire. Not only do they themselves not believe
in such a God, but they cannot imagine that others really believe in one either, let
alone that their lives could revolve around that faith. This phenomenon, which I have
previously called "disbelief about belief," is especially strong in relation to Islamic
fundamentalism, with its bizarre delusions about the impending End Times and the
pleasure garden with 72 virgins. For these ‘disbelievers about belief’, it is tempting to
look for other motives behind religious violence that make more sense from a secular
perspective, such as frustrations about exclusion and discrimination, or the struggle to
dislodge a foreign occupier. I admit that I felt a certain trepidation myself when I sat
down to write a critical commentary for Behavioral and Brain Sciences about Harvey
Whitehouse's theory. It feels strange to be writing about the “blood of martyrs” and
the “gates of paradise” in a serious academic journal. It all sounds so ludicrous and
bizarre that you wonder: Does anyone really believe this stuff? In fact, Harvey
Whitehouse has made his disbelief about belief quite explicit in recent interview. For
him, the thesis about extreme self-sacrifice is part and parcel of his broader take on
religion. Religion is not about a “set of propositions” or a “rational understanding of
nature” at all, but about “building cohesion” in a social group. For all these reasons,
Whitehouse dislikes “new atheists” such as Richard Dawkins who "offend people by
attacking their identities.”
 
Last month saw the publication in the Netherlands of two books that challenge the
academic mainstream head-on: Theoterrorism v Freedom of Speech by the
philosopher of law Paul Cliteur, and Het Vervallen Huis van de Islam (The Decaying
House of Islam) by the sociologist Ruud Koopmans (which will soon be translated into
English). It is no coincidence that both authors are highly controversial in their
respective fields. Koopmans was even called out by his own students who claimed that
his work might feed "anti-Muslim racism", an absurd suggestion that shows how
stifling the politically correct climate in academia has become. Cliteur mainly focuses
on jihadist violence against perceived enemies of Islam, such as cartoonists and
blasphemers, while Koopmans analyzes the extent to which fundamentalism is the
root cause of the deep malaise within the Islamic world today. What these two authors
have in common is that, first and foremost, they are willing to listen to what the
fundamentalists are telling us, and second, they are free from any disbelief about
belief.
 
It is probably not a coincidence that Koopmans, as he himself points out, was raised in
a fundamentalist Pentecostal community. Just like Jason Walters, who turned his back
on the Hofstad Network, he knows from first-hand experience what it means to
believe that the end of the world will soon be upon us, and that this earthly life is only
a temporary abode, insignificant in  the face of the eternal life that awaits us. Most
academics, raised in families that were either godless or perhaps little more than
nominally Christian, have no clue about this sort of thing. It is time for them to shake
off their complacent disbelief about belief and start to take the worldview of religious
fanatics seriously.
 
This piece was based on an op-ed the author published in the Dutch newspaper, NRC
Handelsblad. It was translated into English with the help of Nick Brown.
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